(Bloomberg Opinion) -- In a war fought over Telegram as well as on Ukraine's pummeled streets, the country's actor-turned-president Volodymyr Zelenskiy has excelled. But for over-the-top showmanship, Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov and his men have been hard to beat.
Kadyrov's fighters, known as “kadyrovtsy,” have been waging an all-out propaganda war for the TikTok era, attempting to demonstrate their leader's loyalty to Russian President Vladimir Putin, while burnishing a reputation for being ruthless and battle-hardened, leaning heavily on useful Caucasus stereotypes. Dramatic social media footage of soldiers with cutting-edge kit abounds. Last month, Kadyrov taunted billionaire Elon Musk, who had offered to fight Putin, calling him “Elona” and suggesting he train in Chechnya to “pump up”.
Make no mistake, these men really have been involved in combat over the past weeks, and they've fought for the Kremlin before, in Syria, and in Crimea. But for all their supposed experience, with their heavy-handed PR campaign, Kadyrov and his fighters have come to exemplify the pure brutishness, overconfidence, distorted self-image, and desperate efforts at self-preservation common to Russian officials and military forces in Putin's invasion of Ukraine — not least the Russian leader himself.
Formally head of the region since 2007, Kadyrov has effectively run Chechnya as a fief since his father, rebel turned collaborator, was killed 18 years ago. He holds control with the help of his own brand of ruthlessness, Islamic restrictions, a bilious cult of personality and billions in annual subsidies from Moscow that have funded shiny buildings and top-of-the-range military equipment. Although a creature of the Kremlin, the bearded 45-year-old is distrusted and disliked among Russian security services and other elites, who tolerate him only as the price of keeping the lid on trouble.
The late Russian journalist Anna Politkovskaya provided perhaps the best snapshot of Kadyrov in a chilling 2004 portrait written after a visit to the family compound outside Grozny. Crass and aggressive, surrounded by armed men, the then-27-year-old brags, talks up dog fights and describes himself as a “warrior” who takes no orders. He threatens her, calls her an “enemy.” In the end, she fears for her life and describes him as a baby dragon the Kremlin has fostered: “Now it needs to be fed constantly, so that it does not spew fire.”
Politkovskaya was fatally shot on her Moscow doorstep in 2006.
In this war, Chechen fighters have seen action around Kyiv and in Mariupol, where Chechen officials last week reported Kadyrov made an appearance. According to Ukrainian security forces, these militias, operating as Russian national guard or Rosgvardia units, are being used to cow Russia's own demotivated soldiers into submission and prevent desertion. Other rumors suggest they perform “sweep” operations among the local population, something Kadyrov has hinted at, writing on Telegram that “the clean-up of the city of Mariupol is going at full speed.” Terror, as Russian forces have demonstrated outside Kyiv, is a Russian tactic, and using Chechen fighters certainly sends that message clearly.
For Kadyrov, though, the detail hardly matters. His enthusiasm for the fight is simple — he wants to demonstrate his fealty, and to secure his political and economic rewards from Moscow. Days after the war began, he made a beeline for the minister of finance.
Michael Kofman, director of Russia Studies at CNA, a U.S.-based research body, describes Moscow's predicament in Ukraine today as attempting to fight a limited conventional war in the largest country in Europe (after Russia), with forces grossly insufficient for the territory they are trying to capture. Much of its military is a spent or exhausted force. Unable to call up reserves for what it still calls a “special military operation,” officials are struggling as the current conscripts' service comes to an end. (Russia has sought to professionalize its fighting force, but still relies on conscription, taking men in two annual drafts, one in spring and one in fall. Conscripts are not supposed to serve on the frontlines, though many have.) “Kadyrov is providing manpower for this fight,” he says.
Trouble is, much like Russia's larger military effort in Ukraine, the kadyrovtsy have turned out to be far less impressive than expected. Their operational security is poor — in contrast to Russia's — and they have come under fire thanks to their enthusiastic use of cellphones. Early images of Kadyrov purportedly “in Ukraine” at the start of the invasion were easily debunked. Military analysts viewing their videos have questioned their skills and tactics. Fighter numbers are also a fraction of Kadyrov's early estimate of as many as 70,000 — Kofman says there are likely to be “several thousand,” used as infantry for urban assault. And the forces have also taken heavy losses, like the rest of Russia's military.
The Chechens, like the Russians, expected an easier ride.
Kadyrov remains Putin's most loyal attack dog, and few in the Kremlin will want to stir trouble in Chechnya, no matter what happens after Ukraine. But his own desperation, and the autonomy conceded to him by the Kremlin, could well backfire at home and on the battlefield, where his forces are not always integrated with the rest, diminishing any benefits from their presence.
The only good news for the Kremlin is that, from his gold-flaked office of gold sofas and gold stationery, Kadyrov has thrown himself into this fight. He can't afford a catastrophic loss in Ukraine any more than Putin can.
More From Other Writers at Bloomberg Opinion:
- To Save Democracy, We Need a Few Good Dictators: Robert D. Kaplan
- Putin's New Alter Ego is Igor Strelkov: Leonid Bershidsky
- How to Hold Vladimir Putin Accountable for War Crimes: Editorial
This column does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.
Clara Ferreira Marques is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist and member of the editorial board covering commodities and environmental, social and governance issues. Previously, she was an associate editor for Reuters Breakingviews, and editor and correspondent for Reuters in Singapore, India, the U.K., Italy and Russia.
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