Digital sovereignty has moved, in the space of a few years, from a niche policy phrase to a mainstream governance concern. It is being discussed in boardrooms and cabinet meetings with the same seriousness once reserved for cybersecurity or data protection.
The reason is simple: critical digital infrastructure, once outsourced, can be withdrawn, redirected or disrupted by decisions made entirely outside the country that depends on it. Nothing illustrates this better than what happened to an Indian petroleum company when its access to email, cloud storage and collaboration tools were suspended to comply with European Union sanctions. Examples like this are a reminder that dependence on any single foreign provider, however capable, carries risks that have nothing to do with the quality of the technology itself.
It's worth being precise about what the term 'digital sovereignty' means, because it is often used as shorthand for very different things. At its core, it is the ability of a country to govern its own data, its data centre and cloud capacity, and its critical technologies according to its own laws and priorities, rather than having those choices made for it by foreign corporations or foreign governments.
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Crucially, this is not an argument for isolation: the more credible versions of digital sovereignty are built to be interoperable, able to exchange data, integrate with global platforms, and participate in international trade and research, while retaining the underlying capacity to operate independently, if that access is ever withdrawn. For a country like India, it also carries a foreign-policy dimension: the ability to help shape global rules on data and technology governance, rather than simply adopting frameworks designed elsewhere.
This is not a uniquely Indian preoccupation, with many countries undertaking similar steps. What connects their efforts is a shared recognition, arrived at independently, that in a world of software-defined governance and software-defined warfare, dependence on any single foreign supplier — however capable — is itself a strategic exposure, not just a commercial arrangement.
India has steadily built domestic capability across several layers of digital infrastructure. NavIC provides an indigenous satellite navigation system, reducing reliance on external positioning infrastructure for applications from disaster management to logistics. Unified Payments Interface does the same at far greater scale — indigenous rails that now process billions of transactions a month, and are increasingly exported, with several countries in Africa and the Gulf exploring adoption on India's own terms. The recent migration of parts of the central government's email systems to the domestically built cloud software suite, and the establishment of semiconductor assembly and testing capacity within Indian borders, extend the same logic into cloud services and hardware.
What makes India's approach distinctive, and worth paying attention to globally, is that it has not been built on the premise of technological isolation. India's flagship digital infrastructure — the identity, payments and data-sharing layers that make up what is often called India Stack — was designed as an open platform.
The explicit ambition, articulated by the technologists who built it, was to empower citizens with control over their own data and access, not to centralise control for its own sake. That is a meaningfully different proposition from sovereignty as a closed perimeter, and it is one reason India's digital public infrastructure has attracted interest well beyond countries that share its politics.
Yet, the path ahead isn't necessarily straightforward. India's research and development spending remains low by international comparison. Large parts of government and enterprise still run on foreign cloud, productivity and collaboration platforms, precisely the dependency that recent incidents have made visible. Domestic semiconductor and advanced hardware capability is still in build-out phase. And defence technology indigenisation, despite real recent momentum, has historically lagged the ambition set for it.
The way forward is not a binary choice between self-reliance and openness. It demands sustained investment in domestic research and indigenous platforms, paired with selective, trusted international partnerships that diversify rather than concentrate dependency. This combination has already allowed India to build credible alternatives while remaining an active participant in global technology governance debates.
Digital sovereignty is no longer a peripheral technology issue. It sits at the centre of economic competitiveness, national security and institutional resilience, for India and for every country recalculating its dependencies.
The countries that lead the next phase of this debate will not be the ones that shout loudest about self-reliance, but the ones that build the most credible, most open, most exportable alternatives. On the evidence of the last decade, India has a genuine claim to be one of them.
The article has been authored by Ivana Bartotti, global chief privacy and AI governance officer at Wipro Ltd.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinion of NDTV Profit or its affiliates. Readers are advised to conduct their own research or consult a qualified professional before making any investment or business decisions. NDTV Profit does not guarantee the accuracy, completeness, or reliability of the information presented in this article.
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